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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XIV JULY, 1929 No. 4
LEGAL PERSONALITY-LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL
PREROGATIVE?
BY WILEY B. RUTLEDGE
Once upon a time the legislature of Arkansas undertook to
control by statute a matter of popular pronunciation.' On an-
other occasion, an Indiana legislator "attempted to eliminate
parental difficulties in assisting in geometric problems by legis-
lating out of existence the infinite tail of decimals that attaches
to the ratio ;r.,,2 Chief Justice Holt's claim "that an Act of
Parliament can do anything save alter sex," 3 has recently been
bolstered by the solemn determination by the Wyoming legis-
lature, "in the interest of -historical accuracy," that "the ascent
of the Grand Teton Peak in Teton County, Wyoming, made by
William 0. Owen, Franklin S. Spaulding, Frank L. Peterson,
and John Shive, on the eleventh day of August, 1898, is the first
ascent ever made of that renowned mountain."4  Thus are his-
tory fashioned and immortality conferred by legislative fiat.
It seems that the limit of legislative power has been closely
approached in recent attempts to preserve inviolate for poster-
ity, by means of statutory enactments, the tradition of Adam's
accomplishments. Nevertheless, a suggestion of further exten-
sion of legislative control of thought has recently appeared not
That of the name of the state.
'Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 CoL. L. REV. 113 at 194 (1928).
Ibid. See also Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 407 (1928).
'Session Laws of Wyoming, 1927, p. 215.
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from Tennessee or Mississippi or Arkansas, but from within
the walls of that New England institution which has always
taken pride in its atmosphere of intellectual and academic free-
dom.5 Its purpose is to limit all recognition of "corporate per-
sonality" to legislatively prescribed instances. In any other age
than one of political, social, economic and religious fundamental-
ism, the mere suggestion of legislative absolutivity in the con-
trol of modes of thought which are so common that there are
evidences of them "in all literatures, even the rudest,",, and
which admittedly are "familiar" in popular and legal (and it
might be added, in all) thinking, would be shocking. When the
only purpose and effect of the suggestion are to preserve the
legislatively prescribed "round-about mode" of thinking with-
out reference to the objectives to be reached by the thinking
process,7 the idea would appear absurd did it not proceed from
so eminent an authority. Therein lies its danger. If for no
other reason than the influence which it may have by virtue of
its distinguished origin, it and its foundations should be
examined.
"Legal Personality" is one of the perennial problems of the
science of jurisprudence and of the administration of justice.
Many a "practical" corporation lawyer would be astonished to
learn that the argument he has just advanced in favor of his
corporate client's immunity from liability is the same as that
made in the Papal Courts in the thirteenth century upon issues
of excommunication. The so-called modern doctrine of "dis-
regarding of the corporate fiction" was "promulgated if not
originated by Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254)," who placed the
ban upon omnes singulos without regard to the existence of
the corporate body, the collegium, universitas, or capitulum. So
immortal are ideas, so mortal their origins.
The concept of legal personality is implicit (though often not
'CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION, Edward H. Warren,
Weld Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. New York: Baker, Voorhis
& Co., 1929. Pp. X, 1012.
Ibid., 7.
'Ibid., 14 and 454; see also post pp. 343-349. In general, throughout the
discussion which follows, italics are the writer's, though there are a very
few instances in which they originate with the author quoted.
'Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L. J. 655 at 665 (1926).
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consciously considered) in every legal situation. It inevitably
ensnares the attention of the abstruse legal theologian, the utili-
tarian philosopher of the law, the damage suit lawyer and his
opponent, the corporation counsel, as well as that of His Honor
on the Bench. It reaches out into so-called non-legal fields and
grips the interest of the economist, 9 the philosopher, 10 the stu-
dent of politics," the sociologist 2 and the historian. 3 Evidently
the last word has not been said upon the subject.
In recent years the spot-light of professional discussion has
centered upon problems of corporate organization, reorganiza-
tion and activity, particularly in cases involving "de facto cor-
porations," the doctrine of "ultra vires," and "the disregard of
the corporate fiction." Less frequently, but often enough to
create much confusion, it has bobbed up in partnership cases,
particularly in problems arising on winding up, those involving
the nature of partnership property and of the partner's interest
therein, and those growing out of the adjustment of relations
among the partners themselves. Still less often, but with greater
recurrence in the last two decades, it has appeared in litigation
involving other unincorporated groups, particularly social, fra-
ternal, religious and commercial associations not ordinarily
viewed as technical partnerships, and, in many instances, labor
unions and employers' associations. It is implicit in cases in-
volving trusts, business or otherwise, decedents' estates, and
many other forms of group and individual activity, though in
such instances it is often accorded merely the recognition given
by "polite" society to total strangers or "speaking acquaint-
ances." Throughout the whole range of discussion and applica-
tion of the concept, it is shunted back and forth between "law"
and "equity," Federal and State "jurisdiction," until the wonder
is that the concept has survived at all. Yet, with each kick from
legal pillar to legal post, it absorbs strength and virility.
The usual attack upon the problem is by discussion limited to
some one of the particular fields in which it arises. Perhaps
this is one of the reasons why lawyers frequently view it, not as
the same, but as in some way distinct and unrelated concepts,
' Ripley, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927).
' Op. cit. supra, n. 8.
Tbid., 671, n. 19.
Ibid., 670, n. 18.
Ibid., 656, n. 2.
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when it arises, say, in the field of corporations and in that of
partnerships. We are indebted to Professor Warren for collec-
tion and correlation of cases in all of these fields, with an eye
single to "legal unity" or "legal personality," and for his at-
tempt to discover whether the concept is itself a unit or a col-
lection under one term of several and distinct concepts. It is
but natural that after his long study of the problem, "Under
What, if Any, Circumstances the Corporate Fiction Should Be
Disregarded,' '14 he should examine the law of business associa-
tions "for the purpose of determining under what, if any, cir-
cumstances there may be corporate advantages without in-
corporation.""
It should be stated at the outset that the purpose of the fol-
lowing discussion is not to review Professor Warren's work,
but rather to examine its thesis and the author's approach to the
subject. At the risk of some prolixity, it is deemed best to state
his approach as nearly as possible in his own language. This
will involve considerable direct quotation in the initial stages of
the discussion.
II
Though he disclaims intention to engage in philosophic specu-
lation (p. 7), his approach is a psychological discussion of
methods of the mind in conception. There are, he says, "two
familiar modes of thought," whether concerning associated men
or objects: one, that of thinking of them "as so many'indi-
viduals"; the other, "as merged into a composite unit." Inquir-
ing whether "one method is more familiar than the other," he
finds answer in the number of associates. "If there is only a
small number, . . . the first (i. e., the individualistic con-
ception) ... is more familiar. But, as the number increases,
the second (the unital) becomes the more familiar. If there are
only a few trees (or soldiers or partners), each one has indi-
viduality for us, but if there are thousands, . ..we incline to
think of the forest," (the army or the company) (p. 4).
He then asks: "Which mode does the law adopt?" (pp. 2 and
7), and "Can it be said that although both ...are familiar, yet
" Warren, CASEs oN CoRPoRATIoNs (2d Ed.) 82 (1916) ; Collateral Attack on
Incorporation, 20 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1907), 21 HARv. L. REV. 305 (1908).
"Op. cit. supra, n. 5.
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persons with trained minds agree, after reflection, that one . . .
more nearly accords to reality than the other?" (p. 4.)
For reply to the first inquiry we are plunged into an examina-
tion of the modes of legal thought prevalent during the Ameri-
can Revolution, in the time of Blackstone, and in the reigns of
Henry II and Edward III, presumably upon the theory that the
mind (at any rate, the legal mind) works in the same fashion in
all ages (pp. 7-9). This excursion into legal antiquity gives us
"a clear answer," one "in no wise dependent on the answer which
a particular judge may make to the difficult questions (a) as to
when one of two modes of thought, is more familiar than the
other, and (b) . . .more nearly accords to reality than the
other" (p. 11).
In keeping with its clarity, the answer is brief: "It is only
necessary to inquire whether the legislature has consented that
a body of men should be a legal unit" (p. 11).11 Upon this
Blackstonian Rock of Ages (p. 11), Professor Warren would
build our present law of business associations. This thesis he
reasserts under the guise of three "reasons," which are substan-
tially (stated inversely to the author's order) : That it is neither
(1) wise, nor (2) proper, for courts to treat bodies of men as
legal units, absent legislative authority; and (3) that the legis-
lature could not constitutionally delegate to the courts the power
to so treat them at their pleasure (p. 12). While he promises
careful consideration "whether there should be any exception,"
his conclusion is against one, even "in the one case in which . . .
the most powerful argument can be made for an exception
the problem suggested by the Coronado case" (p. 13).
Masquerading as "two facts tending to show that it is not
wise" (p. 12), the actual reasons appear to be: (1) the doctrine
of stare decisis; (2) the necessity for certainty in the law. To
the first, attention is given throughout the book. Of the second,
after a reference to our old friends, the "two familiar modes of
thought," their relation to reality, etc., it is urged: "All these
sources of confusion are avoided, if we adhere to the law that a
body of men is not to be treated as a legal unit, without legis-
lative authority therefor. For this treats the question as to
which of two modes of thought should be adopted as a question
" Discussion of the author's definition of "legal unit" appears post, p. 349.
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of division of power between the legislative and judicial branches
of our government, and thereby rests the law upon a principle
which can be easily understood and consistently applied" (p.13).3.
Professor Warren also proposes (p. 13) to give consideration
"to some other questions relating to bodies of men which are
closely related." Thus, "we shall inquire to what extent two or
more human being who join to further their financial interests
can, without being regarded as members of a legal unit, never-
theless attain by force of agreement advantages approximating
the corporate advantages," and "to what extent a legislature
may, if it sees fit, give to (such) human beings ...advantages
approximating the corporate advantages without treating them
as members of a legal unit" (p. 14).
It is to be observed that it is the domain of "legal unity"
which is marked out as sacred to legislative occupancy; that this
is the element common to all the inquiries proposed: (1) are
bodies of men to be treated as legal units without legislative au-
thority? (2) What "approximate corporate advantages" can
associated men secure by contract, -without being regarded as
legal units? (3) To what extent may legislatures confer on
them such advantages without treating them as members of a
legal unit? Because of the presence of this common element,
these "related" inquiries resolve themselves into phases of a
single issue, namely, "What is a legal unit?" Without further
light on this, we cannot proceed with the inquiry in any of the
forms in which it is stated.
It is important to observe that the advantages referred to are
not necessarily either controlling or material in the court's
determination of issues presented with reference to bodies of
men, for
(1) "We believe that a legislature can (unless restrained by
some constitutional provision) give such human beings ad-
vantages very closely approximating all the corporate ad-
vantages, without treating them as a legal unit, if it desires to
proceed in that roundabout mode." (p. 14) ;18
'
TIt may be added that it also assumed to make the division, and that
such power is legislative and not judicial.
I The writer assumes (as indeed the author does) that "corporate ad-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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(2) Men may attain "a very close approximation" to them
by agreement or contract, e. g., in the Massachusetts trust cases,
provided, the courts enforce such agreements ;19 and
(8) While the author does not so state, his argument neces-
sarily implies that there could be no objection to the courts con-
ferring or recognizing such advantages, so long as they steer
clear of the legislative preserve of "legal unity," so long as they
proceed in a "roundabout (hence individualistic) mode."
What we are primarily concerned with, therefore, and the
first barrier we have to cross, is that of "legal unity," not that
of "advantages." Before we can proceed to consider advantages
as such, we must know that we are not treating as legal units
the men who claim them.
So fundamental a premise requires elaboration. It receives
attention in one short sentence at the end of the introductory
chapter: "A legal unit," we are informed, "is whatever has ca-
pacity to acquire a legal right and/or incur a legal obligation"
(p. 15). This is the cornerstone of the book.
It is probably because of his aversion to philosophy that the
author leaves us thus to speculate upon the nature of "what-
evers." Had he undertaken to elaborate upon them, he would
have come squarely to face with the initial difficulty which con-
fronts every writer in the field of jurisprudence, the problem
of where to begin. "The law is so closely concatenated that it
is hard to determine where to approach it; an attack upon any
part, to be successful, seems to call for previous knowledge of
other parts. Yet one must begin somewhere."2 Professor War-
ren begins with legal personality.
vantages" are at least illustrative of those secured by and characteristic
of "legal units." Upon the importance of the "round-about mode," see
the text, p. 454. Professor Warren's stress upon it is made despite his
admission (pp. 503-4) that such legislation "usually has a tendency to
complicate and confuse the law," and "to bewilder the public," as for ex-
ample, the statutes involved in Hibbs v. Brown, 112 App. Div. 214, 98 N. Y.
S. $53; (1907) 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108; Warren, CASES ON CORPORA-
TiONS (2d E.) 68.
"A limitation which the author properly classifies as a question Of policy
(p. 14), but of course, since by hypothesis the individuals so acting are
not to be "regarded as members of a legal unit," the policy involved is not
merely that of sacredness of the unital concept.
Gray, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d Ed., 1927), p. 7.
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Analysis of the definition is necessary, that we may clarify,
if possible, our conception of this thing which all but legislatures
must avoid as if it were poison. Taking it as it stands, what
has been done? The term "whatever" seems to have no inde-
pendent significance. Hence, the distinguishing characteristic
of legal units, by our definition, is "the capacity to acquire legal
rights and/or incur legal obligations." By necessary implica-
tion we have asserted that anything which has not this capacity
is not a legal unit. The problem therefore becomes one of de-
termining what has this capacity and what has it not. The
former we shall call legal units, the latter not legal units.
III
The orthodox method of attack is by reference to the views
of others who have thought about the problem. As has already
been noted, material is not lacking here. A few illustrative
references may be helpful.
Let us take for a beginning, a comparatively recent thinker,
Mr. Salmond: "A person, then, may be defined for the purposes
of the law,2 1 as any being to whom the law attributes the capa-
bility of interests and therefore of rights, of acts and there-
fore of duties. ' ' 22
Professor Gray speaks more simply, defining a legal person as
"a subject of legal rights and duties. ' ' 23 This, of course, is sub-
stantially Holland's expression,'24 through whom it is traceable
to Savingny2s and other continental jurists. Professor Smith,
'The concept defined is the same as that denominated "legal unit" by
Professor Warren.
2 JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed.), p. 330. It should be noted that his use of "per-
son" and "being" is not intended to include only human beings, but is ex-
tended to cover "any subject-matter to which the law attributes," etc. See
1. 336.
Op. cit. supra, n. 20, p. 27.
4JURISPRUDENCE (1st ed.), p. 64.
Ibid., quoting Savigny, SYsTEm, ii, p. 1; Puchta, ii, p. 291. Holland's
"improvement" upon the continental expression is in the inclusion of duties
as well as rights: "A 'Person' is often defined as the 'Subject,' or Bearer of
a Right .... Persons are the subjects of Duties as well as of Rights." Of
course Holland's language, "subject" or "bearer," is more abstract and in-
clusive than Salmond's "person" or "being," but he also goes on to discuss
expressly the concept of "artificial legal persons." "Persons, i. e., subjects
of Rights or of Duties are in general human beings; but ... the law rec-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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in his recent very valuable contribution,26 introduces his discus-
sion with a reiteration of this form of statement. He finds an-
other form "perhaps the most satisfactory," namely: "legal per-
sonality is the capacity for legal relations"; but because of his
objection to the use of the word "capacity," 27 his own definition
is framed as follows: "It would seem preferable therefore to
define legal personality either as an abstraction of which legal
relations are predicated or as a name for the condition of being
a party to legal relations."28
Even so abstract a thinker as Professor Kocourek predicates
the minimum of legal existence (his "personateness") upon the
presence of some (though very few) legal relations . .. "a
minimum, a reduction of which would imply a condition of
slavery."29
While these views and the forms in which they are expressed
are by no means exhaustive, they are sufficiently representative
of thought in the field, whether in respect to matters of common
agreement, or in reference to differences of viewpoint, to form a
basis for the beginning of our study. There are in them, im-
plicit if not expressed, significant differences and significant
points of agreement. Multiplication of examples would serve
no useful purpose.
We shall notice first some of the resemblances.
In the first place, there are some points of common agree-
ment as to the scope and extent of the concept. No one of them
limits it, in application, to human beings. With one exception,
all agree that at times it is to be applied to ships, aggregates of
property, idols, groups of people, and in some form or other in
nearly every system of law, to pure abstractions; in other words,
that the concept is wider than that of natural personality.
Again, all recognize that it does not include all of the concept
of natural or human personality. This in several ways. For
instance, that some natural persons have no legal personality.
ognizes certain groups of men or of property ... as Persons in an artificial
sense"
'Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L. J. 283 (1928).
Idem. The basis of Professor Smith's objection will be discussed at a
later point.
"Ibid., p. 284.
Kocourek, JURAL RELATIONS, pp. 4-5 (1927).
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The stock illustration is the slave, though similar assertions have
been repeatedly made concerning monks, felons, married women,
and perhaps other classes of humanity. The assertion is prob-
ably not strictly true with reference to any of them, for it seems
to the writer doubtful whether this condition of complete legal
negation has ever been imposed upon any individual or class of
individuals in any society, despite the often repeated contrary
assertions. There is however enough of truth in the illustra-
tions to support the general conclusion above stated. Further,
all recognize that with reference to some (and in reality very
many) kinds of fact situations, it is, always has been, and
probably always will be, improper (not to say impossible) for
any human being to be considered as having legal personality. This
will include all purely subjective factual situations as well as
many which have expression in conduct and are objective. One
of the authorities quoted goes so far in this direction as to as-
sert: "Legal relations, in strictness, therefore, never exist be-
tween human beings." 80 This, in very striking contrast to the
equally positive assertion of another thinker: " . . . all jural
relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning,
be predicated of . . . human beings."3'
While agreement is general in the respects noted in a broad
way, there are great divergences of view among all of these
thinkers when it becomes necessary to apply the concept of legal
personality to a new and concrete situation, and these similari-
ties are therefore of no great practical advantage.
The matter upon which there is universal agreement, and
which therefore has greatest significance, is the fact that how-
ever varying these forms of statement may be, each one relates
the concept of legal personality to legal relations, or legal rights
and duties. There is implicit or expressed difference of view as
to just what the relation is, but relation of some sort there must
be. Absent this, absent legal personality. It is legal relations,
therefore, which must be investigated.
IV
Before proceeding with this investigation a preliminary in-
'Ibid., p. 57.
' Hohfeld, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, p. 75.
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quiry must be made concerning one divergence of viewpoint
which is apparent. It is to be noted that some of the definitions
are stated in terms of possibility of future existence of legal re-
lations thus indicating a possibility of legal personality apart
from legal relations while others predicate and some expressly
require the present existence of legal relations for the creation
of legal personality. For instance, among the former are War-
ren's "capacity to acquire . . .or incur," Salmond's "capability
of," and the language "capacity for" in the definition approved
generally, but criticised in this particular by Professor Smith.
On the other hand, Mr. Smith's own statement "an abstraction
of which legal relations are predicated or a name for the condition
of being a party to legal relations" is so worded because of his
objection to the use of the word "capacity," as "suggesting the
possibility that the subject may have a capacity for legal relations
without yet having become a party to such relations." 32 His ob-
jection is on the ground that "when legal personality is confer-
red, the subject by that very act is made a party to legal rela-
tions."'3  The briefer statement of Gray, Holland and others,
"the subject of legal rights and duties," is ambiguous in itself in
this respect, but Professor Dewey has recently demonstrated
that the statements of Continental and other English jurists
from whom this form was derived postulate some kind of entity
having properties "antecedently and inherently" in order to be
"a right-and-duty-bearing unit."'3
Our preliminary inquiry then is this: Is legal personality
merely a present capacity for becoming at some future time a
"party" to legal relations, or is it rather the condition of being
presently a party to such relations? Had Professor Smith's un-
married minor with "capacity to marry" a legal personality?
Has A ten minutes before he contracts with B legal personality?
Or must the minor wait until he marries, and A until B actually
accepts his offer, before they can properly be said to be legal
persons? Even in the language of Professor Smith, "the condi-
tion of being a party to legal relations" there is something of the
implication of this "antecedent and inherent property." It is
" Op. cit. 8upra, n. 26, pp. 283-4.
nIbid.
"Op. cit. supra, n. 8, p. 658. And see post p. 365.
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one thing to assert that legal personality exists where there are
present legal relations, but it is an entirely different thing to
assert that there can be no legal existence where legal relations
do not now exist, but may come into being tomorrow. Admitting
the former statement, we cannot assume the latter to be true, in
the face of such evident opposing opinion. It is part and parcel
of the problem. That the idea of pres~nt legal existence predi-
cated solely upon the fact of the possibility of "becoming a party
to" legal relations in futuro is at least subconsciously present in
the thinking of many jurists, is shown by Professor Dewey:
"The postulate, which has been a controlling principle
although usually made unconsciously, leading to the merger
of popular and philosophical notions of the person with the
legal notion, is the conception that before anything can be
a jural person it must intrinsically possess certain proper-
ties, the existence of which is necessary to constitute any-
thing a person."3
Professor Smith states the present distinction clearly, but he
assumes the point. Perhaps he is right, but his unmarried
minor for instance, and many unmarried adults also, would
be very painfully surprised to learn that they are not legal per-
sons for the purpose of marrying. However, their disappoint-
ment will be completely dispelled by the further information that
at the instant they say "I do" in proper legal form, they will
acquire such legal personality. A, in the example above given,
would probably seek another lawyer, if advised that he were not
a legal person to contract with B. The "postuate," made so un-
consciously, may have some practical value and basis of fact. If
so, we cannot disregard it. It is for us to determine whether
such value exists and, if it does, in what it consists.
Mr. Salmond, in his effort to clarify the notion of legal person-
ality, carries this idea further than the implicit assumption
present in the use of his word "capability." "A legal person,"
he says, "is any subject-matter to which the law attributes a
merely legal or fictitious personality. . . . The law, in creating
legal persons, always does so by personifying some real thing.
. . . The thing personified may be termed the corpus of the
legal person so created; it is the body into which the law infuses
Ibid.
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the animus of a fictitious personality." 36 The idea seems to be
that we not only have a "capability" which constitutes legal per-
sonality, but that this capability must have a seat, a "corpus"
and that this seat is always "some real thing," though he admits
that it is not necessary for this to be so in the nature of things.3 7
But he gives us no identification marks by which we are enabled
to distinguish legal Adam's ribs from other real things. True
he enumerates some specific instances, but we are left in ignor-
ance whether the general concept would include microbes or ele-
phants, a grain of sand or the solar system, an unborn infant or
a corpse.
It is strange to find something of the same notion in the
thought of the jurist who so violently disagrees with Mr. Sal-
mond's view of legal personality as to assert that jural relations
cannot exist between men, or "between objects," or "between
human being and object," including animals.38  Professor
Kocourek uses the term "substrate" 39 to express the idea Mr.
Salmond attempts to convey by "corpus." It will be necessary
to examine Professor Kocourek's theory of legal personality
rather fully, in order to arrive at his meaning in the term "sub-
strate," and in doing so we shall find that he introduces another
element or "device" which bears directly upon our preliminary
inquiry concerning the nature of legal personality.
His scheme for expression of the full concept of legal person-
ality consists of three subdivisions or sub-concepts: (1) the sub-
strate; (2) personateness; (3) legal personality.
The substrate may include a human being or other natural
object (or groups of them), and complexes of objects and legal
relations, depending upon the system of law with which we are
concerned. 40 In the case of human substrates, they may be
presently existing, as individuals, aggregates or successions, de-
JURISPRUDR-NCE (7th ed.), p. 336.
His view seems to be that while "the law might . . . attribute the
quality of personality to a purely imaginary being" (ibid., p. 336), yet it does
not do so. On the whole the nature of the "corpus" is to him apparently a
matter of no great importance, since its choice "is a matter of form rather
than of substance, of lucid and compendious expression rather than of legal
principle" (ibid., p. 338).
" Op. cit. supra, n. 29, pp. 57 and 58.
"Ibid., p. 58.
0 Ibid.
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ceased ("retrospective") or unborn ("anticipated"). Apparent-
ly also all forms of substrates are non-jural in character, except
in the case of the Roman law complexes of objects and jural re-
lations, and we may assume that these would be considered non-
jural for substrate purposes by a convenient fiction, in order to
avoid too great complication in conception, and perhaps a "logi-
cal" circle.
The second element of the system is introduced as follows:
"The factual basis of social phenomena is legally organ-
ized through the device of personateness-centers of legal
force and of attraction of legal force-having a capacity
for claims, duties, powers, liabilities, or some of these." 4'
Legal ganglia, so to speak; or, if we may use astronomical rather
than anatomical terminology, planets in the legal solar system.
We are then informed that "personateness being recognized, it
remains a constant center of legal force or attraction," and that
this is so "whatever the vicissitudes which reduce or augment
legal capacity."42
Our hope of finding here the "essential or internal nature" 4
of legal personality is raised only to be destroyed by the informa-
tion that personateness is "constant only in a relative sense, i. e.,
in relation to acts," and that it "may be regarded as a constant
even though it is susceptible of diminution or of augmentation."
Further, that while it is a constant in relation to acts, yet "acts
are highly variable" and "through acts personateness may be
enlarged or diminished." Perhaps what Professor Kocourek is
trying to tell us is that personateness is constant in relation to
some acts, but variable relative to others. The difficulty is that
there is no general classification of acts, nor any formulation of
a determinant for use in discriminating between them. More
comprehensible is the description of personateness as "the mini-
mum capacity for legal relations." But apart from the logical
difficulty involved in thinking of the capacity (the quality) as
identical with that in which it inheres (the thing qualified)
"'centers of legal force . ..having a capacity for legal claims,"
"Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid.
"Op. cit. supra, n. 26, p. 284.
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etc., it is confusing to be informed on the one hand that "per-
sonateness may be enlarged or diminished (through acts), that
is to say, capacities for jural relation may be . . . increased or
reduced . . .," and on the other that it "remains constant what-
ever the vicissitudes of legal condition which reduce or augment
legal capacity." Is personateness a capacity or a center of
capacities--a quality or a thing qualified? If a capacity, is it
merely a minimum capacity, or one variable, "that is to say,"
one that "may be enlarged or diminished," or "reduced or aug-
mented?" Despite the assertion that personateness is a "pure
concept," we also find difficulty in "attributing" capacities, acts
and capabilities of acting, legal condition and its vicissitudes,
and all such things to purely imaginary points of concentration
of imaginary "forces."
Finally, we are informed that in the case of a poor man be-
come wealthy, "while his legal personateness remains the same,
the economic ambit of his jural relations, his legal personality,
has increased." This is the third element of Mr. Kocourek's
analysis. Legal personality, it appears, is a variable, but "here,
also, there is a minimum which cannot be passed without destroy-
ing personateness itself." If the variation is too great it disap-
pears and carries with it personateness.
Just what is meant by the implicit assertion that legal person-
ality is "the economic ambit of his jural relations?" Is it that
"he" has become a party to more numerous jural relations or
simply that he has acquired a wider capacity to do so in futuro?
The term "ambit" rather indicates the latter meaning, but of
course his actual legal relations must of necessity have greatly
expanded, whether he acquired his wealth honestly or by stealth.
Further, what is the relation of legal personality to personate-
ness? If both are mere capacities, it seems that personateness
is simply the minimum of legal personality, and hence not differ-
ent from it in kind, but only in quantity, scope, and extent. If,
however, personateness is only a capacity, and legal personality
is what Professor Smith has called "a name for the condition
of being a party to legal relations," then we have two distinct
concepts and Professor Kocourek's invention of the device of
personateness to designate one of them is justified, despite the
need of clarification of the concept.
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Which of these is his thought? Much of his language regard-
ing personateness is in terms of mere capacity, but when he
undertakes to illustrate the minimum of legal capacity neces-
sary for the existence of personateness, he uses a child just
born of pauper parentage. This infant, he asserts, "would
have legal claims which attach to the protection of his body-
life, limbs, freedom of locomotion, etc. He would have no other
legal relations except those whose object is protection of his in-
tegrity as a free human being. So much, at least, is a minimum,
a reduction of which would imply a condition of slavery." This
is not the language of meie present possibility of future acquisi-
tion; it denotes "present investiture." The pauper infant now
has legal claims, legal relations. The concept of personateness
expresses always more than mere capacity. If legal relations
disappear entirely, out goes personateness with them. This is
also true of legal personality. In their ultimate extinction at
least, personateness and legal personality are Siamese twins.
In birth and death they are one; how it is they function separate-
ly and distinctly in life remains to the writer a mystery. While
it is possible a distinction should be drawn for legal purposes
between the condition of "being a party" to legal relations and
the condition of merely having a capacity to do so, Professor
Kocourek's "device of personateness" is not helpful in making
the distinction, nor in discovering of what value it would be,
for what legal purposes it might be profitably employed. It
seems only to add to the confusion. When concretely applied
the "device" always postulates the present existence of some
legal relations. It cannot therefore aid in finding the answer to
our preliminary inquiry.
Professor Corbin senses such a distinction in his assertion:
"It seems to some of us that society not only commands, but also
permits and enables and disables."'44 While the statement is sug-
gestive, it was made incidentally in the course of a discussion
not primarily concerned with the concept of legal personality,
and we are not shown how and when these permissive, enabling
and disabling societal acts occur. The suggestion, with its im-
" Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 20 YALE L. J. 226 at
237 (1921).
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plications, bears directly upon our problem, however, as will
more fully appear at a later point in our discussion.
To return to Professor Dewey.45 He takes an illustration
from Maitland, who defines a, corporation as "a right-and-duty-
bearing unit. '4 6 The definition, and the language immediately
following, "would appear to use 'person' in a neutral sense, as
signifying simply a right-and-duty-bearing unit," but Maitland's
discussion, says Dewey, "depends upon an assumption that there
are properties which any unit must antecedently and inherently
have in order to be a right-and-duty-bearing unit." To demon-
strate he quotes further from Maitland's summary of Gierke's
position:
"A universitas (or corporate body) ... is a living organ-
ism and a real person, with body and members and a will of
its own. Itself can will, itself can act . . . it is a group-
person, and its will a group will." "In short," he says,
"some generic or philosophic concept of personality, that is,
some concept expressing the intrinsic character of person-
ality ueberhaupt, is implied. And here is room for ques-
tions of general theory and the writing of many books to
show that legal units do or do not have the properties re-
quired by the concept, and that 'will' means this or that or
the other thing."
Dewey then shows how this search for something of a subjective
nature breaks down in its application to corporate bodies, foun-
dations, or associations, or results in voluminous mental gymnas-
tics in the attempt to escape the disaster. 4
At this point another matter of common agreement among
those attempting to clarify the concept of legal personality
should be noted. By a shifting of emphasis it appears clearly
in Mr. Salmond's statement when he speaks of "any being to
whom the law attributes the capability of . . . rights . ... and
of duties"4 8 and more explicitly again: "The law, in creating
legal persons, always does so by personifying some real thing,"
" For a recent valuable discussion of the influence of "non-legal" thought
on legal action, see Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 COL. L. REv. 113
and 285 (1929).
COLLECTED PAPERS, 307 (1911).
Op. cit. supra, n. 8, pp. 658-660, from which are derived the quotations
immediately foregoing.
" Supra, n. 22.
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etc. 49 That it is implicit in Professor Warren's "whatever has
capacity to acquire legal rights and/or incur legal obligations,"
is shown by his statement:
"Of course it is for the law to determine what are legal
units. There is no legal unit whatever except as something
is a unit in the contemplation of the law. Even a human
being is not a legal unit in the nature of things, he is only a
legal unit if the law so contemplates him, and sometimes (as
in the case of monks or slaves) the law did not so contem-
plate him."50
So it is with the briefer form statement adopted by Professor
Gray and others, "the subject of legal rights and duties," as evi-
denced by Gray's statement: "The state may not have created
a corporation, but unless it recognizes it and protects its interests
such corporation is not a juristic person, for such a corporation
has no legal rights."' At times it is necessary to emphasize the
obvious. Legal personality, it appears, is created by the law.
It is the law which in Salmond's language "attributes" or
"creates," in Warren's "determines" legal personality. Its ori-
gin is in law, not, as Professor Warren says, "in the nature of
things."
If we are unwilling to follow Professor Dewey's conclusion,
if we are to assert that it is sufficient for the creation of legal
personality that there be merely a capacity for legal relations
in futuro, let us inquire when it is that the law creates or "de-
termines" legal personality. What is the specific legal creative
process? What are the time, the place, the circumstances of the
"birth" of legal persons? Is there a definite act of legal con-
ception and birth quite apart and distinct from other legal pro-
cesses? Are there two distinct processes, by one of which is
performed the sole function of creating legal personality, by the
other that of creating legal relations? Just what is the process
by which the law "personifies some real thing" or creates "per-
sonateness" out of "substrates," or "determines what are legal
units?"
"Supra, n. 36.
Op. cit. supra, n. 5, pp. 841-2.
o1Op. cit. supra, n. 20, 57. Italics are the writer's. Professor Gray's use
of the termn "corporation" here is in the sense of physical aggregation of
persons--not in its legal significance.
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It may be parenthetically inquired also, whether the fact that
legal personality is created by the law is consistent with the
often-made implicit assumption of the existence of a subjective
entity for discovery of which there is so prolonged a struggle.
Until these matters are determined, we shall not have disposed
of our unmarried and anxious-to-marry minor, nor of A who
wants to contract with B. We shall have occasion to refer to
their problems later, but for the present it appears that we shall
not solve them by any direct search for physical objects or for
abstractions which in their constitutional make-up possess the
capacity for legal relations. Search for Kocourek's "substrate,"
for Salmond's "corpus," for Warren's "whatever," for Gray's
"subject," for Maitland's "right-and-duty-bearing unit," for
Gierke's "living organism," or for the "abstraction" of others
would run us through the vast latitudes of the physical and men-
tal universes, and mayhap land us in the middle of the bog of
"will." The difficulty is in our lack of an omniscient sign-
painter whose business it would be to label the proper objects
and ideas "Legal Unit."
Equally futile is search for Salmond's "animus" and Ko-
courek's "personateness." When we find eminent authorities
informing us, one that in its ultimate analysis legal personality
is always found in human beings, the other that it is never in
strictness to be found in them, the problem of where to look for
it becomes indeed perplexing. At any rate our preliminary in-
quiry must remain unanswered for the present. Direct search
for legal capacity and its constitutive body or seat are unavailing.
V
There remains, however, as we have already noted, another
approach-the point upon which all thinkers upon our subject
agree, namely, the relation between legal personality and legal
relations. While there is divergence as to the nature of the
relation, each recognizes that some relation is essential-that the
existence of legal relations in praesenti or in futuro is the sine
qua non of legal personality. The only common-to-all starting
point is legal relations. If we can discover when, where and
by what agencies they are created, we shall certainly find at
least part of the concept of legal personality. Whether we shall
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find the whole, and thus the answer to our preliminary inquiry
must await the result of our examination of that which we know
to be discoverable. We are therefore squarely confronted with
the problem, "what is a legal relation," or in Professor War-
ren's language "a legal right . . . or a legal obligation," or
duty? If we learn this, determining by what they are "acquired"
or "incurred," we may trail the "whatever," the "legal unit,"
"legal personality" to its lair.
Again we must have recourse to the thought of others. It
should be noted at the start that in some forms of expression the
terminology is "legal right" and "legal duty or legal obligation,"
while in others it is "legal relations" or "jural relations." How-
ever, these expressions are intended to state a single fundamen-
tal concept, and are in themselves not of superlative importance
for the first stages of our inquiry. The important thing is to
understand that the varying forms of expression do represent or
embody a single concept.
"A legal right," Mr. Salmond informs us," . . is an interest
recognized and protected by a rule of legal justice . . .an inter-
est the violation of which would be a legal wrong done to him
whose interest it is, and respect for which is a legal duty," and
more broadly, "any advantage or benefit which is in any man-
ner conferred upon a person by a rule of law. '52 He also quotes
the more simply stated definition of Jhering: "Rights are legally
protected interests."'' 5 Professor Beale has used substantially
similar language: "A right may be defined as a legally recog-
nized interest in, to or against a person or a thing."" Professor
Gray tells us that "the full definition of a man's legal right is
this: That power which he has to make a person or persons do
or refrain from doing a certain act or certain acts, so far as the
power arises from society imposing a legal duty upon a person
or persons," and "the rights correlative to those duties which the
society will enforce on the motion of an individual are that indi-
vidual's legal rights."" Holland's statement is similar: "We
may define a 'legal right' as a capacity residing in one man of
" JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed.), p. 238.
bid.
"Beale, TREATISSE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916), Sec. 139.
Op. cit. supra, n. 20, 12, 18.
' JURISPRUDENCE, p. 56.
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controlling, with the assent and assistance of the state, the
actions of others."58
Among those who speak in the terminology of "relations,"
Professor Kocourek "roughly describes" a jural relation as "a
situation of fact by virtue of which one person presently or con-
tingently may affect the natural physical freedom of another
person with legal consequences 5 7 and in another place as "a
situation of legal and material fact upon which one by his own
wiU may restrict or claim to restrict presently or contingently,
with the aid of the law, freedom of action of another. 58  In his
review of definitions of jural relation,59 he begins with Savigny's
statement, "a relation between person and person, determined
by a rule of law." 60 Examples could be multiplied to no present
use.
Disregarding for the present the confusion evident in the de-
nomination of a right variously as "an interest," and "advantage
or benefit," a "power," a "capacity," and "a situation of fact,"
of what significance for our purposes are these statements of
jurists as to the nature of rights or jural relations? What have
they to do with legal personality?
Simply this, that in every case the definition of "right" or
"duty" or "legal relation" is predicated of persons. Note that
Salmond, Gray, Holland and Kocourek expressly employ the
term "person" or "man," while it is implicit in the expression
"legally protected interest" of Jhering and Beale. Without the
concept of persons, in whom the right inheres or of whom the
relation is predicated, definition of the concept of legal right, or
legal relation is impossible. Even in the more limited and ac-
curate use of the term "right" as denoting simply one form of
jural relation, this necessity appears: "The capability to claim
an act from another is called a 'right' (in the strict sense)" ;6.
and so of other specific relations: "The capability to act against
another is called a power."' 2
Op. cit. supra, n. 29, p. 5.
Various Definitions of Jural Relation, 20 COL. L. REv. 394, 412 (1920).
- Op. cit. supra, n. 29, Chap. III.
Ibid., pp. 31-32.
Kocourek, JURA RELATIONS, p. 3.
Ibid.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
This necessity is given full expression by some. For instance
Mr. Salmond says:
"An ownerless right is an impossibility. There cannot be
a right without a subject in whom it inheres, any more than
there can be a weight without a heavy body; for rights are
merely attributes of persons, and can have no independent
existence."63
So Holland:
"A right . . . postulates: a Person of inherence . . . In
order therefore to understand not only the nature of a right
I.., but also the manner of its creation, transfer and
extinction, it is necessary to acquire clear ideas of the full
meaning of the following terms: I. Person . . .
This "full understanding" he proceeds to give us by defining
"Persons" in terms of "Rights." 5 So also Kocourek:
"Stated summarily, the characteristics of a jural relation
• . . are:
1. Two legal persons.
2. An Act.
3. A definite legal effect following the act,"e
and "a jural relation must have one dominus and one servus. ''1
One further query remains before the paradox is complete. In
defining legal rights or relations in terms of "persons," is the
term used in the sense of natural persons or of legal persons?
Despite the conceptual difficulty of predicating acts of other than
natural persons, it is clear that in all cases the term is used in
its legal and not in its natural significance. There can be no
doubt as to Mr. Kocourek, when we recall his assertion that "a
human being is never directly the dominus or servus of a legal
relation. Legal relations, therefore, never exist between human
beings."6"
So also with Professor Gray, who begins the process of de-
fining legal rights by predicating them of men69 but very soon
JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed.), p. 330.
JURISPRUDENCE, p. 64.
Supra, n. 24.
JuRAL RELATIONS, p. 19.
Ibid., p. 54.
Ibid., p. 57.
Op. cit. supra, n. 20, p. 18 and throughout the first chapter.
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is inquiring whether they may be predicated of other things than
men, of ships, of cattle, and other animals, of ideal conceptions,
even of the Deity. His finding is that in every stage of legal
development, from the rudest systems of barbaric peoples to the
most complex systems governing modern society, legal person-
ality has been attributed to some of these non-human "objects,"
among the most interesting and naive instances being cases
where the Holy Ghost, the Sacred Virgin, and even the Messiah
were subjected to the operation of human laws through this
device.o
The same logical sin may be charged expressly to Salmond
and Holland, and it is safe to assert, to most philosophers writ-
ing before the beginning of the present century. So far from
clarifying our concept of legal personality, our investigation of
thought concerning the nature of legal rights only confuses. In
our search for understanding of legal relations, we get back to
legal personality.
This then is the dilemma. If we undertake to define "legal
personality," we are compelled to find out the nature of legal
rights and duties; when we attempt to discover the nature of
legal rights and duties, we are confronted with the enigma of
legal personality. The doctrine of the renvoi in conflict of laws
is no better illustration of the vicious circle in logic. Such an
approach only shunts us back and forth between two "Unknow-
able Somewhats.7''
VI
The dilemma itself indicates the ultimate connection between
legal personality and legal relations. By a shift in emphasis in
the language of the definitions, it appears that there is also im-
plicit common agreement upon the obvious but important fact
that legal relations, like legal personality, have their origin in
and are created by the law. Whether the form of expression
be that of Salmond's "recognized and protected by a rule of law,"
of Jhering's "legally protected interest," or of Gray's "which the
society will enforce," all postulate a system of law, existing and
operating, for the creation of legal relations. To determine
when and how legal relations are created, and thus what their
* Ibid., Chapter II.
,The writer is unable to cite the author to whom he is indebted for this
phrase.
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relation is to legal personality, to understand what they are and
how they are segregated from the other relations of life which
have no legal significance, requires consideration of the nature
of law, its content, mode of operation and function. This is a
large order, but one we must accept. Since Professor Warren
has not accepted it, the premise upon which his conclusion rests
is unexpressed and of questionable validity.
The confusion which envelops legal personality, legal rela-
tions, and their relation to each other is only a manifestation of
the deeper confusion concerning law, its nature, origin and
function. As Mr. Justice Cardozo has put it, "We shall find that
our theory of the genesis of law has philosophical implications
which do not spend their force in determining our notion of the
origin of law in general, but spread out and affect our judgment
in specific controversies. 72 He finds no more notable instance
than "the influence of metaphysics upon the law of corporations
and the theory of juristic persons." 73 His "tyro in legal studies,"
seeking "a quiet nook where my ears will not be assailed with
the babble of contending schools . . . opens a book on corpora-
tions and seeks to understand the nature of juristic persons.
Nominalist and realist are at each other's throats again ...
Platonist and Aristotelian flock to the standards of their lead-
ers. ' 74 "Neither lawyer nor judge ... is conscious at all times
that it is philosophy which is impelling him to the front or driv-
ing him to the rear. None the less, the goad is there. If we
cannot escape the Furies, we shall do well to understand them."72
There are lawyers who in their hearts regret the passing of
feudal society and the advent of industrialism because thereby
the feudal system of tenures of land has been warped and twist-
ed, if not disrupted. It would be interesting to know to what ex-
tent Blackstone's philosophy of law dominates legal thought in
America today. When we consider that his works constituted
practically the Inns of Court of our legal system for almost the
first hundred years of its existence and the juristic Bible of our
" Cardozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, p. 126 (1924).
"Ibid., p. 129.
" Ibid., pp. 28, 29, 30. For a detailed discussion of the origin of some of
the philosophic influences upon the legal conception of the juristic person,
see Professor Dewey's article cited supra, n. 8.
"Ibid., p. 26.
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Courts for many years, it is not to be supposed that the influence
of his thought could be other than powerful now. Perhaps this
is one explanation for the fact that "Corporate Advantages
Without Incorporation" is dominated by the Blackstonian phi-
losophy of juristic persons. That philosophy, however, is but an
illustration of the process of Blackstone's "theory of the genesis
of law . . . spreading out and affecting his judgment in specific
controversies." Professor Warren has swallowed the instance
whole, without reference to its foundation. In this he is not
without present company, and in high places.
What was Blacktone's philosophy of law? "If man were to
live in a state of nature," says he, "unconnected with other indi-
viduals, there would be no occasion for any other law than the
law of nature and the law of God. Neither could any other law
possibly exist; for a law always supposes some superior who is
to make it . . . But man was formed for society and . . . is
neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do
it. ' '76 In considering the nature of civil law, he points out that
it "regards him . . . as bound to other duties toward his neigh-
bor than those of mere nature and religion; duties which he has
engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and
which amount to no more than that he do contribute, on his part,
to the subsistence and peace of the society." 77
In the fashion of the modern sociological jurist, Blackstone
traces the evolution of civil institutions from the family to the
three forms of government then prevalent, remarking the ad-
vantages and weaknesses of each. He has no modesty about his
own preference. The British form, with Parliament as the
supreme authority, is the embodiment of governmental perfec-
tion. His theory of society flowers in the supremacy of the
legislature, confounds it with sovereignity . "convertible
terms" . . . and identifies legislative mandates with "divine
and natural duties."78 The legislature "acts only . . . in sub-
ordination to the great Lawgiver, transcribing and publishing
His precepts." 79 This of course applies to all "actions that are
COMmENTARcES, V. I, p. 43.
" Ibid., p. 45.
"TIbid., pp. 46, 47, 51.
"Ibid., p. 54.
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naturally and intrinsically right or wrong," but the jurisdiction
of the legislature is apparently wider than that of divinity or
nature, for with regard to "things in themselves indifferent"
they "become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or
misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper,
for promoting the welfare of the society."' 8o The difficulty of
discriminating between the two classes of acts causes him no
great concern, nor is the necessity for placing human sanctions
behind divine and natural duties explained. Legislative infalli-
bility is such that its mandates automatically accord with divine
precepts, and while "obedience to superiors is the doctrine of re-
vealed as well as natural religion," it becomes strangely, "the
province of human laws to determine" "who those superiors
shall be, and in what circumstances, or to what degrees they shall
be obeyed."'81
In such a scheme, the position of the courts could not be other
than subordinate. Theirs are the functions of "putting the laws
into execution," of interpreting legislative declarations where
ambiguity requires, of administering equity (wherein they act
without "established rules and fixed precepts," dealing only with
unusual cases not provided for in the law). Perhaps their high-
est duty concerns the lex non scripta, the "jus commune or folk-
right," which consists of maxims and customs "of higher an-
tiquity than memory or history can reach,'182 and whose validity
is to be determined "by the judges in the several courts of
justice."8 3 But even in this their action is not conclusive, for
where their decision is "most evidently contrary to reason, much
more, if it be clearly contradictory to divine law" or "if it be
found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust,
it is declared not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it
was not law. . . . So that the law and the opinion of the judges
are not always convertible terms.18 4 Infallibility is no judicial
attribute. While their decisions may reach the dignity of strong
evidence "of what is common law,"85 theirs is no part of the busi-
ness of law making. Law is either ready made for them, re-
Ibid., pp. 54, 55. 'Ibid., p. 69.
"Ibid., p. 55. "Ibid., pp. 69, 70.
'Ibid., p. 67. "Ibid., p. 73.
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quiring only that they correctly discern and discover it; or if it
be not so, only the legislature can manufacture it.
Out of this hodge-podge of prevailing and antecedent political,
religious, social, and "moral" philosophy, two predominant in-
fluences, mutually antagonistic in their ultimate assumptions
concerning the nature of law, stand in clear relief. They are,
first, the influence of theories of "higher law," law as derived
somehow from somewhere above and beyond human institutions,
chiefly the Deity and'/or "natural law" in all the various signifi-
cances of the term; and second, the influence of the political
philosophy of the day, in the theory of legislative absolutivity.
The presence of two such contradictory theories might be ex-
plained by reference to the author's native inconsistency, did
not such an explanation assume his philosophy to be a peculiarly
personal one. In fact it was not at all the work of a creative
genius, but rather a representative compilation of the dominant
thought of his time. ' His essential conservatism made him a
fitting instrumentality for its expression.
The notion of "higher law" was, of course, not new in Black-
stone's time. From a century before Demosthenes to the time
of Calvin Coolidge is the long span of its life, and each of these
philosophers was its devotee.8 7 We cannot undertake here to
trace, even in rough outline, the history of the concept, in its in-
numerable transformations from generation to generation, from
struggle to struggle, throughout this tenure of "perpetual suc-
cession."8 It is sufficient for our purposes to note that it is the
final resort alike of individualist and of absolutist; of Jeffer-
sonian and of Hamiltonian; of abolitionist and of secessionist; of
prohibitionist and of anti-prohibitionist. It constitutes the
" "The events in 1688 in England established the supremacy of Parliament
and Coke's proposition (see post, n. 91) failed to maintain itself." Pound,
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, p. 75 (1921). The same observer also traces
the origin of "our absolute ideas which have prevailed so largely in Ameri-
can legal thinking" through Blackstone to Grotius. Ibid., p. 150.
Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARV. L. REv., 149 and 365, at 153 (1928).
" Recent valuable discussions include not only Professor Corwin's article,
n. 87 but also that of Professor Dickinson cited supra n. 45. cf. also Dean
Pound's numerous writings on the subject, especially his SPIRT OF THE COM-
MON LAW.
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equally secure foundation of the "Rights of Man" and of the
"Divine Right of Kings." Within its limits there is room for
the inalienable "Right of Revolution" and the unalterable duty
to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" in its entire
integrity. It is the ultimate refuge alike of Pope and Prince and
Puritan; of Edward Coke and James I; of Patrick Henry and
George III and his ministers. There is no human cause but has
its sacred origin in higher law. The difficulty is not as to its
existence, but in the fact that each participant in the momentary
conflict considers himself its special beneficiary and the exclusive
human agency through which it operates.89
The theory of legislative supremacy, however, was not so an-
cient. It was a newer idea, devised as most philosophies are, for
a purpose. It too had its transformations. Professor Corwin
has recently traced its metamorphosis from its appearance in
the philosophy of Coke and of Locke to its ultimate fQrm in the
Commentaries.9 In brief, in their thought, "the maintenance
of higher law was entrusted to legislative supremacy," and Par-
liament became, not the final author and creator of law, free
from its limitations, but simply its champion in the struggle, dat-
ing from Magna Carta, to bring the sovereign also within the
law. Higher law and the theory of legislative supremacy were
simply allies in the struggle with monarchical absolutism. It is
no such modest claim which Blackstone makes in Parliament's
behalf. While he renders lip-service to the notion of higher
"For, as has always been true when men have believed in absolute
theories of the sort, the principles, supposed to be the dictates of nature,
flow in practice from one of two sources. On social, economic and ethical
questions, nature was always found to dictate the personal views of the indi-
vidual jurist as they had been fixed and settled by education, association,
and, perhaps, class interest. On legal questions, nature was found to dic-
tate for the most part the principles of law with which the individual jurist
was familiar, and under which he had grown up .... The past generation
of lawyers, brought up on Blackstone, learned this mode of thinking as part
of the rudiments of legal education." Pound, SPnIT OF THE COMMON LAW,
p. 95.
Op. cit., supra, n. 87, p. 365 ff.
Ibid., p. 404. Coke's famous dictum in Bonham's Case, "that in many cases,
the common law will control acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them
utterly void," etc., amounted, of course, to an assertion of parliamentary
subjection to "higher law." Although later as a member of parliament, when
his effort was directed against another and a royal foe, he did not hesitate
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss4/1
LEGAL PERSONALITY
law,92 it is only lip service; for "at the end, despite his previous
equivocation," he loses sight of the mission of Parliament as an
instrumentality for the maintenance of higher law, and does not
"flinch from the conclusion that the whole legal fabric of the
realm was . . . at Parliament's disposal."v
to advance the theory of parliamentary supremacy, his argument must be
assessed in the light of its purpose, which was no exaltation of parliament
above Magna Carta's provisions or assertion of its liberation from all limita-
tion of higher law, but rather was the subjection of the power of the mon-
arch also to its limitations. Professor Corwin points out that in Coke's as-
sertion of legislative supremacy he is apparently referring principally to
parliament as a court, and that Blackstone consequently misconstrued his
statement as an assertion of the parliament's unrestricted authority in its
legislative capacity, Ibid., p. 378. See also pp. 367-380 for further discussion
of Coke's positions. However this may be, and notwithstanding his apparent
inconsistency in language and position, the fact remains that Coke was
always "the embattled commoner" (ibid., p. 377), and in this character he
asserted the supremacy now of this institution, now of that, as a means of
checking and refuting the more absolute claims of some other.
" As Professor Corwin says in another place (ibid., p. 376), Blackstone
"seems to be attempting to bridge the gap between two conflicting theories
of law," and while he appears "undismayed in the presence of the palpable
contradictions in his pages, adept in insinuating new points of view without
unnecessarily disturbing old ones," (ibid., p. 405) his ultimate conclusion is in
accordance with the prevalent theory of legislative supremacy. "True it is,
that what Parliament doth no authority upon earth can undo." I Bl. Com.
161, quoted in Corwin, op. cit., p. 407, n. 133.
"When one recalls that Parliament, acting as the "trustee" of natural
law, and hence of popular sovereignty or individual liberty, had been the
instrumentality by which, at the cost of a sovereign head and revolution, a
final victory had been achieved in the struggle for limitation of the preroga-
tive of the crown; that this resulted in an unprecedented degree of indi-
vidual freedom and participation in government by the English people; that
Parliament's position was greatly strengthened by the advent of the Han-
overian line; and that the period in which Blackstone wrote was one of ex-
traordinary commercial and national expansion, colonization and inter-
national trade operating at the time to relieve congestion of population and
bring new wealth to those at home, it appears that there was a veritable
conspiracy of events for the exaltation of the parliamentary position. It
was not an unnatural step, therefore, for those most excellent results to be
attributed to the institution which had been so influential in bringing them
about, or for its "fiduciary" position to be ignored. Further it was desirable
for these conditions to be perpetuated as far as possible, and it was an en-
tirely natural assumption that the instrumentality by which they had been
created could and would perpetuate them. The business of the time, so far
as the resident Englishman was concerned, was the maintenance of the
status quo, and the notion of legislative finality was the most available phil-
osophy for accomplishing this objective.
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The very conditions which brought about the change in the
theory from its form as propounded by Coke and Locke to that
advanced by the Commentator, were to lead eventually to its
limitation within the British Commonwealth of Nations to the
British Isles and to its rejection in the establishment of our
institutions. 4 How the conception "failed to finally establish
itself in our constitutional system," is a matter of our constitu-
tional history, during which "the notion of the sovereignty of
the ordinary legislative organ disappeared automatically, since
that cannot be a sovereign law-making body which is suborlinate
to another law-making body."'9  Blackstone did not note in his
basic principle the very evil which it was, in its origin, designed
to eliminate,96 because he did not take account of the fact that
unrestrained power, like wealth, begets itself. The ultimate
objective of the age-old struggle, in all its transformations, has
been for the discovery and establishment of a human institution
"At the very time when Parliament was sloughing off its fiduciary char-
acter and throwing higher law into the junk-heap, this ancient idea of law
was in process of revivification in America. It was now the colonies which
were appealing to higher law, asserting its supremacy over Parliament and
Crown. Their grievance was that they were denied the benefit of the pro-
visions of Magna Carta and the "rights of British subjects." It was in the
events which led up to the Revolution that the alliance between higher law
and the theory of legislative supremacy was finally dissolved, and as is too
often true of allies, they became aligned in the subsequent conflict against
each other. It is significant that the experience of the colonists with the
Legislative Absolute in actual operation led not only to our adoption of the
principle of separation of powers, but also contributed to the mother country
the modern philosophy of the British state, in which Parliament does not
legislate for the dominions, but limits its legislative authority to the British
Isles and possessions not occupying the status of dominions. Corwin, op. cit.,
supra, n. 86, p. 402.
" Op. cit., supra, n. 86, p. 409. Professor Corwin attributes this result not
only to the fact that under our governmental machinery the Supreme Court
was finally able to establish its superiority to Congress, but also to the fact
that "in the American written constitution, higher law at last attained a
form which made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new sort of
validity, the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people.
Thus Congress became subject to two superior authorities in the business of
making law, the people and the courts.
ICorwin expresses the danger thus: "All the varied rights of man were
threatened with submergence in a single right, that of belonging to a popular
majority, or more accurately, of being represented by a legislative majority."
Ibid., 408. The old foe of unrestricted power had simply substituted legis-
lative garb for monarchical raiment or priestly vestment.
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which, vested with final authority in society, will not abuse its
power and assume the role of tyrant. It is the frailty of human
nature which makes of today's champion of liberty, victorious
in the conflict, tomorrow's defender of privilege. Successively
in the course of history, first as liberator, later as tyrant, march
the figures of emperor, priest, king, legislator. At the time of
the formation of our institutions, the villain in the piece was
the legislator. It was to prevent repetition of recent painful
experience with him and his philosophy, that the device of "sep-
aration of powers" became the foundation upon which the frame-
work of our government was constructed, bolstered by the intro-
duction of "checks and balances." Thus was instituted a new
experiment in the limitation of power, out of which was to come
a new Ultimate, the judiciary."' When it came in the course of
time to override the solemnly enacted will of a "co-ordinate"
branch of government or of the people themselves, the charge of
usurper was again to be raised and new checks proposed, selec-
tion of judges by popular vote, the initiative and referendum,
the proposal for the recall of judges and their decisions, pro-
posals for requiring more than a bare majority of the court
to set aside an act of Congress and other measures to check the
final authority in our society.
It is thus that out of the unending struggle for power and
its privileges, for limitation upon it and its tyrannies, come
philosophies of the day, weaving themselves into the fabric of
government and of law. So they become invested with the ap-
pearance of ultimate truth, tangled up with all our notions of
the sacredness and eternity of law, and remain to deceive and
delude, long after life and history have made final disposition of
the issues and men which brought them into being. Conse-
quently form, letter, precedent triumph over function, spirit,
justice. He who "makes unto himself any graven image, . . .
of maxims or formulas, to-wit,"9' 8 will find himself fighting in
opposing armies . . . if he live long enough.
Blackstone's philosophy of law was thus in its day a living
thing. But he who today uses "this obsolete legal science,"' 9
"Cf. Pound, SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw, p. 63, where he discusses this
constant "shifting of the center of political gravity."
" Cardozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, p. 107 (1924).
" Pound, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw, p. 150 (1921).
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disregards the course of conflict and of life for a century and
half, and denies himself the privilege which Blackstone claimed,
that of fitting his philosophy to his objective and to the condi-
tions under which he must strive to attain it. We have passed
the era of the Legislative Absolute. Professor Warren's basic
thesis must be supported, if at all, by more potent consideration
than the outworn legal philosophy which he so naively assumes.
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